Migration-driven women’s empowerment:  The case of Turkey by AKKOYUNLU, Şule
Journal of 
Economics and Political Economy 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 4                         December 2017                           Issue 4 
 
Migration-driven women’s empowerment:  
The case of Turkey 
 
By Şule AKKOYUNLUa† 
 
Abstract. This paper addresses the effect of migration on women’s empowerment in Turkey.  
Utilization of data over six decades from 1960 until 2011 gives the possibility that these series can be 
spuriously correlated. This study, therefore, adopts the bounds testing procedure as a method to 
determine and to avoid spurious correlation. The results of bounds testing gives clear-cut evidence 
that women’s empowerment, the share of women in parliament in the present context, is related to the 
emigration rate, the relative education of women and to a measure of democracy. It is also found that 
the share of women in parliament is related to the country groups with the largest effect in European 
and core OECD countries. The results are robust for the inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees in 
the emigration data. 
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1. Introduction 
he migration-development nexus considers ‚three Rs‛ – recruitment, 
remittances and return. Remittances are financial remittances, and the 
majority of migration and development research focuses on the effects of 
financial remittances on sending countries.  However, migrants are exposed to 
different values, norms, narratives, and forms of behaviour in different host 
countries. The transfer of these different values, norms, narratives, and forms of 
behaviour, as well as the knowledge and skills that are acquired in host countries – 
termed social remittances – can have a substantial impact on the economic and 
human development of home countries. More importantly, social remittances are 
more stable and robust even during the financial and economic crisis. Figure 1 
below shows the growth of financial remittances to Turkey and it is evident that 
financial remittances are rather unstable and fluctuate, since they are sensitive to 
the economic and financial situation in host countries and, therefore, they can be 
unstable or can decrease during economic downturns. 
 
Figure 1. Growth of financial remittances to Turkey 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
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Therefore, this paper studies the impact of social remittances on a typical 
emigrant country – Turkey. First, this study contributes to the literature on social 
remittances, and hence to the literature on the migration-development nexus.  
Second, we examine Turkey, which has been an important migrant sending country 
since the 1960s, destination countries for Turkish citizens having varied over the 
years. Hence, the close investigation of emigration by destination countries will 
highlight how social norms and how the values of migrants in different destinations 
are formed differently. Third, the paper investigates the effect of emigration on 
women’s empowerment – the share of women in the Turkish parliament along with 
other variables such as the relative education of women and a measure of 
democracy. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study which investigates 
social remittances in Turkey as well as the determinants of the share of women in 
parliament. This is an important task given that one of the Millennium 
Development Goals is to promote gender equality and to empower women. Fourth, 
Lodigiani & Salomone (2012) is particularly relevant to our stidy finds that 
migration to countries with higher woman political empowerment significantly 
increases the share of women in parliament in the home country. However, their 
data cover the 1960-2000 period and migration data is available only by decade. 
Our data are annual and cover the post-2000 period when there was a major shift in 
the parliamentary participation of women in Turkey.  Fifth, the utilization of data 
over six decades from 1960 until 2011 gives the possibility that these series can be 
spuriously correlated. Therefore, the paper addresses the issue of spurious 
correlation in an analytical way. Spurious correlation entails the risk of linking the 
parliamentary share of women, for example, to the emigration rate when, in fact, 
there is no association. This study adopts the bounds testing procedure suggested 
by Pesaran, Shin & Smith (2001) to determine and thwart spurious correlation. The 
bounds testing procedure as outlined in Section 5 has more advantages than other 
methods and can detect the genuine relationship between the variables in question. 
This is, we stress again, the first study that employs the bounds testing procedure in 
the field of social remittances. Sixth, asylum seekers and refugees might have 
stronger views about their home countries and their institutions and, therefore, 
might transfer more social values, norms and ideas than labour migrants. However, 
it is also possible that they might break contact with the home countries and start a 
new life in a new country: in this case they, naturally, do not have an impact on the 
home country’s institutions. Therefore, the patterns of behaviour of asylum seekers 
and refugees might differ from other migrants and, in order to take this into 
account, we also include asylum seekers and refugees in the emigration data and 
replicate the exercise. Last, but not least, the paper discusses the political 
implications of the findings for both sending and receiving countries, since the 
empirical results deliver important insights. Migrants are, indeed, exposed to 
different social norms and values in different destinations, and, therefore, transfer 
destination-specific norms and values that can have different and diverse impacts 
on sending countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the social 
remittances. Section 3 discusses women in politics in Turkey; section 4 describes 
the data and its sources; in Section 5 the bounds testing procedure of Pesaran et al. 
(2001) is described in detail; in Section 6 the test results as well as the final models 
are presented; and the final section concludes by delivering important policy 
implications.  
 
2. Social remittances  
Social remittances are defined as ideas, know-how, norms, values, knowledge, 
behaviour, practices and skills that migrants bring with them or that they send 
back. These promote or deter development in home countries, (Levitt, 1998, 2001, 
and Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011). Levitt (2001) argues that, in fact, social 
remittances are more important than financial remittances. She mentions four types 
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of social remittances that are transferred from migrants to their home countries: 
norms, practices, identities and social capital.    
Social remittances can be diffused by migrants as well as by refugees. They are 
transferred when migrants return or visit their home countries; when non-migrants 
visit their family and friends in the destination countries; or when a letter (or 
phone-call, fax, email, video...), is received (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011).  
Social remittances do not only affect family relations, economic and social well-
being, gender roles, class and race identity. They also have a substantial impact on 
political, social, cultural, economic and religious participation. They can challenge 
people’s ideas, beliefs and views about, among other things, democracy, politics, 
institutions, health, culture, society, religion, technology, science, business, 
economics, education, and gender issues. For example, Jimenez (2008), Kapur 
(2008) and Batista & Vicente (2011) point out that more migrants and non-
migrants participated in politics as a result of international migration and that 
political power between actors shifted.  Docquier et al. (2011) find that emigration 
has a strong impact on democracy as well as economic freedom in home countries. 
Similarly, Spilimbergo (2009) demonstrates that foreign students diffuse 
democracy if their education is acquired abroad in democratic countries. 
Comparatively, it has been shown that higher votes for the communist party, at the 
district level in Moldova, are explained by migration to Russia, while a negative 
correlation is associated with migration to the EU (Omar Mahmoud et al., 2013). 
Beine & Sekkat (2012) find that emigration has an impact on the quality of 
institutions1 in the sending countries, and this depends especially on whether 
emigrants are located in countries with better quality institutions. For the diffusion 
of education, Stark (2003) shows that highly-skilled immigrants encourage the 
non-migrant population in their home countries to invest in education, which 
generates more human capital than if no brain drain had taken place.2 Likewise, 
migration can affect gender imbalances in several ways. Belanger & Rahman 
(2013) show that, though the international migration of Bangladeshi women 
liberated women economically. Lindstrom & Munoz-Franco (2005) find that 
knowledge of contraceptive methods spread from migrants to non-migrants in rural 
Guatemala. Frank (2005) shows that international migration has a positive impact 
on infant health (birth weight) in Mexico, in spite of the loss of social support and 
high stress levels due to the migration of the family members. Mexican women 
with international migrant partners have, in fact, significantly lower rates of 
smoking, higher levels of exercise, and gain more weight during pregnancy than 
their counterparts in Mexico without migrant partners. However, the transfer of 
practices does not always result in uniformly positive changes in behavioural 
practices, as women with international partners were less likely to breastfeed their 
infants. Fargues (2007, 2011) find that birth rates in Morocco and Turkey went 
down, because migrants went to Europe, where they encountered small-size 
families and individualistic values. In contrast, in Egypt birth rates rose, because 
most Egyptian migrants went to the Gulf, where they encountered larger families 
than those left behind and deeper-rooted patriarchal values. Likewise, Bertoli & 
Marchetta (2013) show that Egyptian households with a returnee husband from 
another Arab country have a significantly larger number of children. Similarly, 
Beine, Docquier & Schiff (2013) demonstrate that the transfer of norms from low-
fertility destination countries reduces fertility in migrants’ home countries. These 
studies demonstrate that social remittances are, indeed, an important part of the 
migration experience. 
 
3. Women in politics in Turkey 
Turkish women achieved political rights to elect and to be elected locally 3 
April 1930 and nationwide 5 December 1934, well in advance of women in 
European countries such as France, Italy and Belgium.3 Until multi-party 
democracy in 1946, there was an unofficial quota of 4-5 percent for women in 
parliament. However, after the increased competition in politics in the 1950s, 
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women’s share in parliament dropped to 0.61 percent. The figure remained at 1-2 
percent until the 1990s with the exception of the 1983 elections when the share 
rose to 3 percent. Since the mid-1990s, the share of women parliamentarians has 
increased. However, the figure remains low compared to other European countries. 
Several factors can explain the increase in women’s parliamentary share in Turkey 
over the past decades. First, the Fifth Five Year Development Plan (1985-1990) 
and ‘the General Directorate for the Status and Problems of Women’ in 1990 
recognised women’s issues and aimed at strengthening the position of women in 
social, economic and political life, and at providing the equal utilization of rights 
and opportunities. Second, criminal and civil law was reformed in 2002 and 
women and men officially were granted equal rights during marriage, divorce, and 
property rights. As a result of this reform, programmes were introduced to improve 
access to education for girls. Third, several measures were taken to increase 
schooling for girls, by the Turkish government and NGOs, (Caha, 2010). Third, the 
KA.DER association (The Association for the Support and Training of Women 
Candidates) was established in 1997 to support women candidates both within the 
political parties and also publicly at general elections, and to increase the number 
of women in politics and in decision making positions. Fourth, the Republican 
People’s Party (RPR - CHP) introduced a gender quota of 25 percent in 1989 and 
increased it to 33 percent in 2012. Whereas, some parties such as the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP - AKP) had adopted soft gender quotas, and some mainly 
ethnic Kurdish parties like the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP - BDP) or the 
Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP - HDP) has promoted female representatives at its 
core.  Fifth, emigrants, by bringing back home social, cultural and political norms, 
values, ideas, and narratives from the more democratic destination countries, might 
have encouraged women’s participation in politics in Turkey. 
It is widely recognised that the participation of women in politics in Turkey was 
not limited by legal means: it was rather a question of cultural, traditional and 
mental obstacles (Kasapoglu & Ozerkmen, 2011; Cansun, 2013). Cansun (2013) 
finds that Turkish men do not want to share housework and child-care 
responsibilities with women, and that; therefore, Turkish women do not have time 
for politics. Politics is considered to be a male domain in Turkey, and it is believed 
that Turkish men are more natural politicians than Turkish women. More 
importantly, Turkish men would be jealous of their spouses if they worked in male-
dominated occupations such as politics (Cansun, 2013). The following (invisible) 
barriers contribute to the low participation of women in politics in Turkey. 
 Patriarchal structure: Turkish women follow their husbands or parents in political 
decision-making (Caporal, 1982). 
 Turkish women view politics as an arena of lies, fraud, unfulfilled promises, and 
corruption and so prefer other occupations (Keskin, 1997; Kasapoglu & 
Ozerkmen, 2011). 
 Turkish women are financially constrained and do not have much capital for 
political campaigns (Keskin, 1997; Kasapoglu & Ozerkmen, 2011; Cansun, 
2013). 
 The low level of education among Turkish women hinders their participation in 
an elitist democracy (Koray, 1995; Kasapoglu & Ozerkmen, 2011). 
 The Islamist view (fitrat) argues that women should carry out family roles while 
men deal with other issues (Ergil, 1975). 
However, the increase in women’s parliamentary share in Turkey over the past 
decades suggests that these obstacles might be fading away: the patriarchal 
structure is weakening and Turkish women are entering into a more independent 
decision-making processes. This paper, therefore, questions whether Turkish 
emigration has contributed to the change in mentality/attitude towards the 
participation of Turkish women in politics, along with other important variables, 
such as the relative education of women and a measure of democracy. Thus, we 
question whether Turkish migrants, by transferring cultural, social and political 
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ideas, norms and values from the host countries, have contributed to the 
transformation of the political lives of women in Turkey. 
 
4. Data 
We will study the determinants of women’s parliamentary share in Turkey with 
the emigration rate as well as with other important potential variables, such as the 
relative education of women and a measure of democracy. The main variables in 
our analysis are: 
The share of women in the Turkish parliament was obtained from the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey. 
The emigration rate is defined as the number of Turkish migrants divided by the 
Turkish population. Emigration data were gathered from the General Directorate 
for Security in Turkey, whereas the data on the Turkish population were obtained 
from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). The emigration data consist of 
Turkish nationals who are resident in Turkey as well as abroad. The emigration of 
Turkish nationals who are resident abroad is especially relevant in our case, as they 
are the ones most likely to transfer social, cultural, and political ideas, norms and 
values to Turkey, by having regular contacts with Turkish citizens left behind. 
Although, the majority of emigration data covers labour migrants, the data also 
include students as well as visitors for the following purposes: culture, holiday, 
relatives, sports, entertainment, business, and medical treatment.  
The education variable for women is defined as the ratio of girls to boys in 
primary and secondary schools4 and was gathered from the Education Statistics of 
the TSI. 
The Freedom House Index for Liberal Rights5 is used as a measure of 
democracy. The index covers the main attributes of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The civil liberties questions consist of four sub-categories: 
Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational 
Rights (3 questions), Rule of Law (4 questions), and Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights (4 questions).6 Then, the index is constructed by summing up 
each country’s sub-category. The index ranges from 1 to 7.  Countries with a rating 
of 1 enjoy liberties in freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and 
religion. Countries with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties and, therefore, 
do not have freedom of expression or association. They do not protect the rights of 
detainees and prisoners, and often they control or dominate economic activity. 
According to this index Turkey currently protects, at least to a moderate extent, 
almost all civil liberties: ‘Partly-Free’. This is a fair assessment.  
The data on emigration by county of destination were gathered from the General 
Directorate for Security in Turkey. The destination countries are grouped into three 
groups:  
 EU and OECD Countries: Austria, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, 
Iceland, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Australia, USA, Japan, Canada, 
New Zealand, and Israel. 
 Arab Countries: Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Libya. 
 Russia and CIS countries: Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.  
We also included Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the emigration data and 
repeated the exercise as a robustness check. The data on Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees come from the UNHCR Population Statistics, and are available by 
country of destination. 
Other important potential variables, such as per capita real GDP, were also 
considered in the estimates, but they did not produce any significant results. The 
labour force participation of women was another important potential variable, but 
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this variable is only available from 1988, and it is strongly correlated with the 
relative education of women.7  
We were, therefore, able to analyse the determinants of the parliamentary share 
of women in Turkey with the emigration rate, the relative education of women and 
a measure of democracy. Importantly, Figures 2, and 5 show the salient features of 
the data that the share of women in parliament has certain common features with 
the emigration rate, the relative education of women and the democracy variable. 
This visual inspection suggests that the share of women in parliament, the 
emigration rate, the relative education of women and the democracy variable tend 
to move together and leaves statistical methods to verify this conclusion. For 
example, an increase in women’s parliamentary share in the post-1990 period 
matches closely the increases in the emigration rate and the relative education of 
women.8 However, over the entire period, the share of women in parliament and 
the relative education of women seem to be highly correlated. Therefore, we expect 
to see the largest effect on women’s parliamentary share from the relative 
education of women. Likewise, the share of women in parliament, emigration share 
to the EU and OECD countries, and emigration share to the Arab countries all 
tended to increase in the late-1960s, 1970s and the early-1980s. Therefore, the 
salient features of the data and their relationship over the entire period suggest a 
formal econometric analysis to determine these relationships. 
 
5. Method 
The bounds testing procedure of Pesaran et al. (2001) which is used to address 
the spurious correlation problem as well as to detect a long-run relationship 
between the variables of interest will be presented in this section. The choice of 
this procedure can be justified based on the following reasons. First, the bounds 
testing procedure has a straightforward applicability, as the regressors can be either 
I(1), I(0), or mutually cointegrated. This is of great importance, since the different 
unit root tests can deliver different results with respect to the order of the 
integration of the relevant variables, yielding inconclusive results as well as pre-
testing bias. Second, the bounds testing procedure allows a joint estimate of short- 
and long-run effects, since it is based on the unrestricted error correction model. 
Banerjee et al. (1993, 1998) show that joint estimates have better statistical 
properties than the two-step Engle Granger procedure, which shifts the short-run 
dynamics into the error term. Third, the bounds testing procedure performs very 
well in small samples, (Narayan, 2005). In small samples, other methods such as 
the more popular Full Information Maximum Likelihood Method (Johansen, 1995) 
perform poorly.  
The bounds testing procedure will, in the present context, be performed by 
relating women’s parliamentary share to the emigration rate, the relative education 
of women and a measure of democracy according to a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model of order p that can be further reduced to the following conditional error 
correction model (ECM):  
 
       (1) 
 
WP, Emig, Educ and FHI denote, respectively, women’s parliamentary share, 
the ratio of emigration to Turkish population, girls to boys ratio in primary and 
secondary schools, and the Freedom House Index for liberal rights.  The lagged 
values of WP, Emig, Educ, and FHI (are in logs) present, respectively, a long-run 
relationship in levels.   and tD  are the deterministic terms; constant and dummy 
variables. The short-run dynamics is represented by lagged values of tWP   and 
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current and lagged values of tEmig , tEduc  and tFHI . The conditional long-
run elasticities of women’s parliamentary share with respect to Emig, Educ and 
FHI are given by, respectively, 01 / , 02 /  and 03 /  (Banerjee et al., 
1998). 
The bounds testing procedure utilizes the conventional F-test for testing the null 
hypothesis . Although Pesaran et al. (2001) provide a set of 
asymptotic critical values, generated from 1,000 bootstraps, these values are not 
appropriate in our case due to our small sample size. We, therefore, employ the 
critical values simulated in Narayan (2005) for the hypothesis testing for a small 
sample size.  
Two sets of critical values are important for the hypothesis testing. The first set 
is the lower bound, applicable when all regressors are I(0). The second is the upper 
bound, applicable when all regressors are I(1). If the calculated F-statistic falls 
below the lower bound, the null hypothesis of no relationship between women’s 
parliamentary share, and the emigration rate, the relative education of women and a 
measure of democracy cannot be rejected. However, if the calculated F-statistic 
exceeds the upper bound, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between 
the variables of our interest is rejected. Both cases hold irrespective of the order of 
integration of the regressors. Finally, if the F-statistic falls within the lower and 
upper critical bounds, the order of integration of the variables must be determined 
in order to draw conclusive inference.  
 
6. Test results and the final models 
Equation (1) was estimated for the four cases: (i) the emigration rate is defined 
as emigration divided by the Turkish population; (ii) data on asylum seekers and 
refugees are included in the emigration data, and the emigration rate is defined as 
emigration including asylum seekers and refugees divided by the Turkish 
population; (iii) emigration data are grouped into three groups according to 
destination countries; and (iv) data on asylum seekers and refugees are included in 
these three destination groups. 
 
6.1. Aggregate emigration without asylum seekers and refugees 
As a starting point, we define the lag order p for the Equation (1). Table (1) 
displays the results of the lag order p selection procedure. The information criteria 
(Akaike, AIC, and Schwarz, SIC) and the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for 
remaining autocorrelation up to the first, fourth, and sixth orders in regression 
residuals are used for the lag order selection. The data cover the time period from 
1972 until 2011, as the Freedom House Index is available only from 1972. Both 
information criteria (AIC and SIC) select p=5. In addition, there is no evidence of 
any remaining autocorrelation in the regression residuals, when p=5. Given the 
results from the information selection criteria and the evidence of no residual 
autocorrelation, the model with p=5 is chosen. The last column of Table 1 reports 
the corresponding F-test statistics for the joint hypothesis   
utilising the finite-sample critical values reported in Narayan (2005) for T=35, 
corresponding to case III – with unrestricted constant and no linear deterministic 
trend.  
As shown in Table 1 the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between 
women’s parliamentary share, the emigration rate, the relative education of 
women, and a measure of democracy can be decisively rejected for p=3 and p=5 at 
the 1% significance level. For p=1, p=2, and p=4 the test statistics falls below the 
lower bound at the 1% significance level, indicating that there is no long-run 
relationship between the variables of interest. 
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Table 1. Lag order selection for the model with aggregate emigration data  
p AIC SIC AR(1) AR(4) AR(6) 
 
1 -2.618 -2.058 0.215 0.063 0.035 5.655++ 
2 -2.604 -1.864 0.012 0.037 0.086 3.888++ 
3 -3.315 -2.392 0.149 0.098 0.300 9.106*** 
4 -3.187 -2.076 0.031 0.010 0.012 3.521++ 
5 -5.005 -3.927 0.059 0.494 0.401 59.204*** 
Notes: p is the lag order of the underlying VAR model for the conditional ECM of Equation (1). AIC 
and SIC are, respectively, the Akaike and Schwartz Information Criteria. AR(1), AR(4), and AR(6) 
are the p-values of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for testing, respectively, for residual 
autocorrelation of orders up to one, four, and six. Bold entries represent the preferred lag order. 
 is the F-test statistic for the null hypothesis  using the finite-
sample critical values simulated in Narayan (2005, p. 1988) for T=35 corresponding to case III – with 
unrestricted constant and no linear deterministic trends. ‘***’ indicates that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 1% significance level. ‘++’ indicates that the test statistic falls below the lower bound 
at the 1% significance level, therefore, the null hypothesis of no relationship in levels cannot be 
rejected.    
 
After establishing the existence of a long-run relationship between women’s 
parliamentary share, the emigration rate, the relative education of women, and a 
measure of democracy, we estimate the coefficients of interest as follows: we start 
with an error-correction model corresponding to p=5; delete the insignificant 
augmentation lags; and arrive at the parsimonious model in Equation (2) (standard 
errors in parentheses, and error probabilities in brackets). In the model below (2), 
t
D2002  denotes an impulse dummy that is equal to 1 in 2002 and zero otherwise, 
since an outlier in 2002 was detected as those residuals exceeding regression 
standard error by factor two in the estimated equation (1). The dummy, in 2002, 
justifies a decrease in women’s parliamentary share in that year that cannot be 
explained by the emigration rate, the relative education of women, and a measure 
of democracy.9  
 
 
 
The model in (2) passes all the standard specification tests such as tests for no 
residual autocorrelation, for no residual ARCH effects, for residual normality and 
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the RESET test for functional form misspecification.10 This suggests that this 
parsimonious model explains women’s parliamentary share very well over the 
period under investigation, a period that was characterized by several national 
political and economic crises, and major legislative and social changes. This is 
further supported by the close match between actual and fitted values shown in the 
top panel of Figure 3; and the corresponding cross-plot is shown in the right top 
panel. The estimated regression residuals do not show any signs of misspecification 
in the left bottom panel of Figure 3. The autocorrelation function up to fifth order 
which is displayed in the right bottom panel takes small values that, moreover, 
change signs. Finally, Figure 4 shows the values of the one-step, breakpoint, and 
forecast Chow test statistics scaled by their respective 1% critical values (Doornik 
& Hendry, 2001). These tests show no signs of model instability. 
According to Equation (2), the long-run elasticities of women’s parliamentary 
share with respect to the emigration rate, the relative education of women and a 
measure of democracy are, respectively, 0.49, 7.16 and 0.25. The largest effect 
comes from the relative education of women; 1% increases in the ratio of girls to 
boys in primary and secondary schools increases women’s parliamentary share by 
7%. This is a very large effect. Similarly, 1% increases in emigration rate increases 
the share of women in parliament by 0.50%. This is also a significant impact. Thus, 
emigration contributes to women’s empowerment in Turkey.  
The largest effect comes from the relative education of women in the short-run.  
However, changes in the emigration rates in the current period, and lagged one and 
three periods have a negative impact, implying that in the short-run the emigration 
rate decreases the share of women in parliament. Possibly, in the very short-run 
potential women candidates for the parliament are emigrating, but as time passes 
these migrants exert a positive impact by transferring the political ideas, norms and 
values from the host countries, since changes in emigration rate lagged four and 
five periods have a positive effect. In addition, it might take more than a few years 
to settle in a foreign country and to become acquainted with the social, cultural and 
political norms and values, and then to transfer them. Furthermore, the negative 
effect of emigration in the short-run might also occur, if the people who are 
emigrating are the most influential people and if they are involved in the current 
social, cultural, and political arena and debate. 
However, overall results show that Turkish migration, indeed, exposes the 
Turkish population to more democratic values and norms; and more importantly 
migrants transfer these values and norms to those left behind, something that helps 
transform Turkish society. 
We also estimated the Equation (1) by updating the emigration data by adding 
the data on asylum seekers and refugees from Turkey. On the one hand, asylum 
seekers and refugees might not influence the social, cultural and political dynamics 
of the country left behind, start a new life in a foreign country, and lose their 
contacts with their home country. On the other hand, they are the ones most likely 
to make a change, as they are the ones who speak about institutional failures. We 
found a positive long-run impact of emigration which suggests that emigrants 
including asylum seekers and refugees do not lose touch with their fellow citizens, 
and more importantly that they transfer those social, cultural and political norms 
and values accumulated in the destination countries.   
 
6.2. Emigration by destination country without asylum seekers and 
refugees 
In this section, we estimate the impact of emigration by destination country. 
Although the majority of Turkish labour migration was directed towards European 
and the OECD countries: in the 1980s and 1990s Arab countries and also, in the 
1990s, Russia and CIS countries played an important role in Turkish migration, 
(Icduygu, 2009). Icduygu (2009) reports that in fact 71% of labour migrants went 
to Arab countries between 1975-1980, and 98% between 1981-1990 and 60% 
between 1990-1995, yet this figure started to decline after 1995.  We need to take 
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into account this important fact even if our data include not only labour migrants, 
but also students and visitors. Therefore, in this section, we investigate the 
destination-specific spillover effects of emigration on women’s empowerment in 
Turkey. We expect emigration to democratic countries, such as European and other 
OECD countries, to have a greater and a more positive impact on the share of 
women in the Turkish parliament than emigration to the Arab and Russia and CIS 
countries. This is because migrants in the Western countries are exposed to 
Western political institutions, Western culture as well as Western systems. This 
transformative experience can induce migrants to change their political attitudes, 
beliefs and preferences and hence support women in politics in Turkey. However, 
migration to religious or autocratic or semi-autocratic countries such as Arab 
countries and Russia and CIS countries can have a weaker effect on women’s 
parliamentary share in Turkey. Therefore, in this section, we will account for the 
destination-specific effects on women’s empowerment in Turkey.  
The bounds testing procedure in the present context will be performed by 
relating women’s parliamentary share to emigration to EU and OECD countries, 
emigration to Arab countries, emigration to Russia and the CIS countries and the 
relative education of women11 according to a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of 
order p that can be further reduced to the following conditional error correction 
model (ECM):  
 
 
 
WP, EmigEUOECD, EmigARAB, EmigRussiaCIS and Educ denote, 
respectively: women’s parliamentary share, the share of emigration to the EU and 
OECD countries in total emigration, the share of emigration to the Arab countries, 
the share of emigration to Russia and the CIS countries in total emigration, and 
girls to boys ratio in primary and secondary schools. The lagged values of WP, 
EmigEUOECD, EmigARAB, EmigRussiaCIS and Educ (are in logs) present a 
long-run relationship in levels.   and tD  are the deterministic terms; constant and 
dummy variables. The short-run dynamics is represented by lagged values of and 
current and lagged values of tWP  and current and lagged values of 
tEmigEUOECD , tEmigARAB  tCISEmigRussia  and tEduc . The 
conditional long-run elasticities of women’s parliamentary share with respect to 
EmigEUOECD, EmigARAB, EmigRussiaCIS and Educ are given by 01 / , 
02 / , 03 / , and 04 /  respectively (Banerjee et al., 1998). The data 
span 1960 to 1995, since the emigration data by destination countries are only 
available until 1995. 
We start by defining the lag order p for the Equation (3).12 Table (2) displays the 
results of the lag order p selection procedure. The information criteria (Akaike, 
AIC, and Schwarz, SIC) and the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for remaining 
autocorrelation up to the first, fourth, and sixth orders in regression residuals are 
used for the lag order selection. AIC selects p=3, whereas SIC selects p=4.  
However, autocorrelation tests deliver better results for p=3, therefore p=3 is 
preferred.  The last column of Table 2 reports the corresponding F-test statistics for 
the joint hypothesis  using the finite-sample critical values 
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reported in Narayan (2005) for T=30, corresponding to case III – with unrestricted 
constant and no linear deterministic trend.  
As shown in Table 2 the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between 
women’s parliamentary share, emigration share to the EU and other OECD 
countries, emigration share to the Arab countries, emigration share to Russia and 
the CIS countries and the relative education of women can be decisively rejected 
for p=3 at the 1% significance level. For p=1, p=2, and p=4 the test statistic falls 
below the lower bound indicating that there is no long-run relationship between the 
variables of interest at the 1% significance level. 
 
Table 2. Lag order selection for the model with emigration data by destination countries  
P AIC SIC AR(1) AR(4) AR(6) 
 
1 -2.491 -1.818 0.236 0.064 0.035 3.219++ 
2 -2.521 -1.614 0.045 0.122 0.000 3.543++ 
3 -3.335 -2.235 0.125 0.032 0.191 8.151*** 
4 -3.282 -2.357 0.009 0.016 0.023 4.215++ 
Notes: p is the lag order of the underlying VAR model for the conditional ECM of Equation (4). AIC 
and SIC are, respectively, the Akaike and Schwartz Information Criteria. AR(1), AR(4), and AR(6) 
are the p-values of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for testing for residual autocorrelation 
of orders up to, respectively, one, four, and six. Bold entries represent the preferred lag order.   
 is the F-test statistic for the null hypothesis  using the finite-
sample critical values simulated in Narayan (2005, p. 1988) for T=30 corresponding to case III – with 
unrestricted constant and no linear deterministic trends. ‘***’ indicates that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 1% significance level. ‘++’ indicates that the test statistic falls below the lower bound 
at the 1% significance level, therefore, the null hypothesis of no relationship in levels cannot be 
rejected. 
 
After establishing the existence of a long-run relationship between women’s 
parliamentary share, emigration share to the EU and OECD countries, the 
emigration share to Arab countries, emigration share to Russia and the CIS 
countries, and the relative education of women, we estimate the coefficients of 
interest as follows: we start with an error-correction model corresponding to p=3; 
and we delete the insignificant augmentation lags; and arrive at the parsimonious 
model in Equation (4) (standard errors in parentheses, and error probabilities in 
brackets). In the model below (4), tD1993 denotes an impulse dummy that is equal 
to 1 in 1993 and zero otherwise for the outlier in 1993.13 
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  (4) 
 
929.02R , F(23,8) = 4.559[0.016], T = 32 
 
 
 
The model in (4) passes all the standard specification tests, such as tests of no 
residual autocorrelation, of no residual ARCH effects, of residual normality and the 
RESET test for functional form misspecification.14 Figure 6 also proves that there 
are not any signs of misspecification.  Figure 7 shows that model is stable. 
The long-run elasticities of women’s parliamentary share with respect to 
emigration share to the EU and other OECD countries, emigration share to Arab 
countries, emigration share to Russia and CIS countries, and the relative education 
of women are respectively 7, 2, 0.5 and 7.5. Although the majority of labour 
migrants in the 1980s and 1990s went to Arab countries, emigration to these 
countries has much less impact on the share of women in the parliament compared 
to emigration to the EU and to other OECD countries.  
The results show that the diffusion of democratic and social norms and values is 
stronger when Turkish migrants go to the EU and OECD countries. Thus, the 
destination-specific effect of emigration on women empowerment is important: 
Turkish emigration to the West encourages women’s empowerment in Turkey. The 
effect is striking. A one percentage point increase in migration to the EU and 
OECD countries increase the change in the share of women in the Turkish 
parliament 7 percentage points in the long-run, almost the same magnitude as the 
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education variable. Turkish migration to the West convey to non-migrants in 
Turkey values, norms, and practices that contribute to women’s empowerment as 
much as does the education of women. In contrast, emigration to Arab countries 
had comparatively less impact on women’s empowerment; likewise emigration to 
Russia and CIS countries did not particularly impact women’s parliamentary share. 
Emigrants to Arab countries are more likely to support the religious parties and 
their ideologies in Turkey.15 Migration can, indeed, strengthen religious identities, 
especially in destinations where religion has an important part in the daily life, 
(Ahmad, 2005; Osella & Osella, 2007; and Rajagopal, 1997). Although religious 
parties in Turkey, e.g. the Welfare Party (WP - RP), activated millions of women to 
circulate the party’s ideology by going door to door, women did not have enough 
places in the representative and administrative systems of the party. In fact, there 
was only one woman from the Welfare Party (WP - RP) in parliament during the 
period have examined. This might explain the low impact of emigrants to Arab 
countries on women’s parliamentary share in Turkey. 
However, the results show that Turkish migration to the EU and OECD 
countries has been important in determining women’s empowerment in Turkey. 
Thus, indeed a foreign country experience can have an effect on people’s attitudes, 
preferences and decision-making such as the participation of women in politics. 
However, the ideas and experience that migrants bring with them or send back 
home differ by country of destination. Thus, social remittances can have a negative 
side as well, depending on the country of destination. 
We also estimated Equation (4) by updating the emigration data by destination 
countries by adding the data on asylum seekers and refugees from Turkey and the 
results do not change our conclusions. Thus, emigration to the EU and to OECD 
countries has the largest effect on women’s empowerment compared to other 
destinations, confirming the importance of the destination-specific effect of 
emigration for social remittances. 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study draws attention to the fact that knowledge and ideas as well as social, 
political and cultural norms and values are circulated and diffused with migration. 
We used time series data on Turkish emigration at the aggregate level, as well as 
by destination countries, in order to investigate the impact of emigration on 
women’s empowerment – the parliamentary participation of women in Turkey, 
1960-2011. This was an important task given that gender equality enhances 
productivity and economic efficiency, improves development outcomes for the 
next generation as well for children, and makes institutions more representative 
(World Bank, 2011). Thus, gender imbalances influence laws, politics, and policy 
making, institutions and policies in favour of the interests of those with more 
influence, something which further exacerbates gender imbalances. Therefore, 
when women play an active role in politics, they improve the health, education, 
economic and social status of women themselves, children and families more 
generally (Thomas, 1991 and Clots-Figuera, 2011).  
We showed that Turkish emigration, indeed, affects the share of women in the 
Turkish parliament at the aggregate level as well as by destination countries, along 
with the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary schools, and a measure of 
democracy. Therefore, we can conclude that emigration is an important 
determinant of women’s empowerment in Turkey, and hence contributes to the 
equal representation of women and men in the decision-making process. The most 
significant impact comes from the migrants who go to the EU and OECD 
countries. They encounter there democratic values and bring the same home.  Thus, 
emigration to advanced democracies can help with the democratization of the 
source countries. Whereas, emigration to Arab countries and to Russia and to CIS 
countries has less impact on women’s empowerment in Turkey. This could be 
because, migrants to Arab countries might be politically and economically 
supporting the religious party in Turkey and during the period of our analysis the 
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religious party had only one woman in parliament. The effect of emigrants to Arab 
countries on women’s empowerment was, therefore, smaller. Similarly, emigration 
to less democratic countries, such as Russia and to CIS countries delivered much 
less in the way of women’s empowerment. 
The formation and evaluation of political preferences for women through 
emigration have important policy implications for both sending and for destination 
countries. First, migration, and thus social remittances should be accepted as an 
important component in development for both sending and destination countries. 
Democratically, politically and socially more advanced countries should welcome 
migrants from less developed countries, given the evidence in this study that 
migration not only alleviates labour market constraints in sending countries and 
contributes financially. It also helps transform the political, social, and cultural 
lives of the sending countries. Second, migrant women organisations or migrants’ 
organisations that seek to empower women in the destination countries should be 
supported and encouraged by destination country governments. Third, these 
organisations should be linked to organisations in the home countries by the 
sending country governments. Fourth, more formal dialogues through conferences, 
seminars, and workshops should be established and strengthened between migrants 
and non-migrant communities by both sending and destination country 
governments and NGOs. Fifth, the social, political and cultural problems of the 
sending countries should be investigated and better understood by destination 
countries, and the migrants should be understood as a central element for 
understanding these problems, finding solutions as well as contributing to non-
migrant communities in the home countries through ideas and knowledge as well 
as norms and values accumulated in the host countries.  
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Notes 
 
1  They employ four indicators for the quality of institutions, namely, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption.  
2  See also Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001), Katz & Rapoport (2005) and Mariani (2007) for 
migration-induced human capital investment. 
3 Türkiye'nin 75 yılı, Tempo Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1998. 
4  We also tried the ratio of women to men in tertiary education in Turkey, but this data did not 
produce any significant results. 
5   We also tried the Freedom House Index for Political Rights, POLITY IV, and Economic Freedom 
of the World as a measure of democracy, but the Freedom House Index for Liberal Rights produced 
better results. 
6   Freedom House Index. [Retrieved from].  
7  In our study, we also considered the possible effects of emigration on the relative education of 
women and also on the measure of democracy. Therefore, we took into account the indirect effects 
of emigration on women’s parliamentary share in Turkey as well as the correlation between the 
independent variables. However, we found that emigration had no effect on the relative education of 
women, and on the measure of democracy; therefore, the independent variables are not correlated.    
8   The inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees in our emigration data does not change the main 
pattern of the emigration data. Similarly, the inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees to the 
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emigration data by destination countries does not make much of a difference. These observations 
are also confirmed by similarities in the coefficient estimates of emigration rates with and without 
asylum seekers and refugees. The results of the estimations are available from the author. The 
estimates were done before the 2015 election and therefore they do not include the results of the 
2015 elections. However, the share of women in the parliament increased only from 14.3 percent in 
2011 to 14.7 percent in 2015. Therefore, we expect the results to remain the same. 
9  In 2002, various political measures were taken to improve the social, economic and political status 
of women in Turkey; however, we would expect these measures to have a positive impact on 
women’s parliamentary share. Therefore, this dummy cannot represent political changes either. 
10 Even though the final model has 34 observations and 24 parameters, therefore 10 degrees of 
freedom in estimates, the sample size is only one of the factors that determine how much 
information appears in the sample, see Campos & Ericsson (1999). Figures 2 and 5 show that the 
variability of the data, and hence the informational context of the data are very high. In addition, the 
large t-ratios suggest that over-parameterization is not an issue in our case. 
11 We could not include a measure of democracy in this case, because of the small sample size. 
12 Unfortunately, we could not test for higher orders of lag, due to the sample size. However, the lag 
order of 4 delivered very satisfactory results. 
13 An outlier in 1993 was detected and the dummy in 1993 accounts for a decrease in women’s 
parliamentary share in that year that cannot be explained by the emigration share to the EU and 
other OECD countries, emigration share to Arab countries, emigration share to Russia and CIS 
countries, and the relative education of women. 
14 The final model uses 8 degrees of freedom in estimates relative to 32 observations, however, over-
parameterisation does not only depend on the number of coefficients estimated and the sample size, 
but also on the variability of the data – the informational content of the data which is very high in 
our case. Again, over-parameterisation is not a concern in our case, due to the nature of our data. 
15 During the 1960-1995 period, three religious parties were active in politics in Turkey: the National 
Order Party (NOP - MNP) (1970-1971); the National Salvation Party (NSP - MSP) (1972-1980), 
and the Welfare Party (WP - RP) (1983-1998). The National Salvation Party (NSP - MSP) gained 
11.8% of the votes and was granted 48 seats in the parliament in the 1973 elections, and gained 
8.6% of the votes and won 24 seats in the 1977 elections. However, in neither elections did it have 
any women member in the parliament. The National Salvation Party (NSP - MSP) was banned after 
the military coup in 1980. The Welfare Party (WP - RP), which was founded in 1983, was granted 
40 seats in the parliament in the 1991 elections and had only one woman member in that parliament. 
In the 1995 elections, it won 158 seats in the parliament, but again it had only one woman member 
in the parliament. 
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Figure 2. The Salient Features of the Data, Aggregate Emigration without Asylum Seekers 
and Refugees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Actual and fitted values; Cross-plot of actual and fitted values; Regression 
residuals (r:DWP); Autocorrelation function of regression residuals (ACF-r:DWP), 
Equation (2). 
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Figure 4. Recursive stability 1-step; breakpoint; and forecast Chow test statistics scaled by 
their respective 1% critical values, Equation (2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Salient Features of Data with Emigration Data by Destination Countries not 
including Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
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Figure 6. Actual and fitted values; Cross-plot of actual and fitted values; Regression 
residuals (r:DWP); Autocorrelation function of regression residuals (ACF-r:DWP), 
Equation (4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Recursive stability 1-step; breakpoint; and forecast Chow test statistics scaled by 
their respective 1% critical values, Equation (4). 
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